Thursday, February 1, 2007

This Bug Could Ruin Your Day..


Yes this virus could ruin your day, not to mention your friends and family, food supplies, and perhaps life as we know it. Don't panic...Uncle Sam will tell us when to start worrying

with their new Flu Rating System, much like Homeland Security's Alerts or National Weather Service's severe storm alerts, etc....

Avian Flu Pandemic predictions for U.S.

"Our results illustrate that the greatest economic cost is due to death (Table 6). Therefore, all other things being equal, the largest economic returns will come from the intervention(s) that prevents the largest number of deaths. A limitation of the model is that, beyond the value of a lost day of work (Table 3), the model does not include any valuation for disruptions in commerce and society. For example, if many long-distance truck drivers were unavailable to drive for 1 or 2 weeks, there might be disruptions in the distribution of perishable items, especially food. These multiplier effects are not accounted for in this model, mainly because an estimate of an appropriate multiplier will depend on who becomes ill, how many become ill, when they become ill, and for how long they are ill."

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no5/meltzer.htm

CDC

More info: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no5/melt_back.htm

Fact Sheet on Legal Authorities for Isolation/Quarantine

http://www.maphtc.iupui.edu/html/CD_Training/SARS/html/Quaratine/factsheetlegal.pdf

Bug Map…on Google Earth

http://declanbutler.info/blog/?p=58


Related Blogs

http://www.ogleearth.com/2006/09/avian_flu_layer.html

http://facweb.furman.edu/~mwiniski/wordpress/2006/12/29/great-google-earth-feature-time-animation/

http://www.gearthblog.com/

Military Enforcement of Health Measures

In light of recent concerns that a strain of avian influenza could mutate to cause a pandemic, President Bush has suggested that Congress should authorize him to employ military forces to enforce any quarantine that might become necessary in the event of an outbreak in the United States. President Bush also suggested that the National Guard might be employed under federal rather than state control to carryout measures to contain such an outbreak. Critics of the proposal have expressed concern that an additional exception to the Posse Comitatus Act,which prohibits active military personnel from carrying out certain law enforcement activities without express statutory authority,would lead to a form of martial law, with the attendant threats to civil liberties

Source: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33201.pdf

Public comments on smallpox preparedness that would have implications for avian flu pandemic……

http://www.cchconline.org/pr/publiccomments.php3

CCHC'S SUMMARY OF CONCERNS REGARDING THE ACIP PROPOSAL

MANDATORY QUARANTINE MAY INCREASE EXPOSURE: The requirement that all individuals with confirmed, probable and suspected cases of smallpox infection be placed in a "Type C" facility may expose the noninfected (the not yet confirmed) to smallpox, leading to an increase in smallpox infection. It also appears to be proposed without a court order. (Isolation and Quarantine Guidelines, Guide C, page C-4 and C-5).

MANDATAORY VACCINATION VIOLATES FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE: The requirement that all persons entering a Type C facility must be vaccinated with smallpox vaccine exposes these individuals to the side effects of the smallpox vaccine. Most may be more than willing, but not all will agree to the vaccine. Small pox vaccine can cause severe side effects including death. This constitutes a state-imposed injection of a life-threatening substance, violating the individual's freedom of conscience and medical ethics. And, until proven otherwise, there is no guarantee that the vaccine will eliminate the risk of illness even for those who are vaccinated. In addition, unlike those who volunteer for vaccination, there is no requirement that these individuals read, understand and sign a consent form for the vaccination. (Isolation and Quarantine Guidelines, Guide C, page C-5)

MIXING POTENTIALLY NON-CONTAGIOUS WITH CONTAGIOUS: Although officials are to set up "Type X" facilities to house those with "uncertain diagnoses" they propose that these individuals may be placed in Type C facilities-with those who are confirmed to have smallpox. This requirement may expose these individuals to smallpox, endangering their lives. (Isolation and Quarantine Guidelines, Guide C, page C-5 and C-7)

LOSS OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR NON-VACCINATED: Although the proposal states those refusing vaccination, who are assumed to be exposed, can be sent home ("Type R"), it allows government officials to detain them outside their home-without a court order. This permits state officials to impose a loss of freedom on those who choose to exercise their freedom of conscience. It also permits the livelihood of individuals to be threatend. Vaccination itself carries risks, including the risk of getting the disease from the vaccination, spreading the illness beyond the limited location of those actually diagnosed with smallpox through shedding of the vaccine, and death and disability as a side effect of the vaccination. Those who do not choose to get the vaccine are those who have chosen one risk over another. If the vaccine is effective-the only type of vaccine that should be given-those who are vaccinated need not fear those who are not. Those who choose not to be vaccinated should not be penalized for exercising their freedom of conscience.

POLICE POWERS VIOLATE DUE PROCESS: The proposal to provide "security staff " with the capacity to detain persons for examination and quarantine and the power to enforce mandatory isolation of contagious patients is cause for concern. As read the proposal would endow security staff with the power to enter homes and haul citizens away before there is any clear evidence of communicability or danger. This is a violation of due process rights and an individual's freedom of movement and security of home. And in the case of forced detention and vaccination, a violation of the person's right to a freedom of conscience. (Guidelines for Smallpox Vaccination Clinics, Annex 2, p. A2-10 and A2-17 and Isolation and Quarantine Guidelines, Guide C, p C-17)

With the implementation of such police powers, the agency should not expect to secure the second factor of the three factors noted as necessary for successful quarantine: public trust and compliance. (Isolation and Quarantine Guidelines, Guide C, page C-17)

ENDANGERMENT OF INDIVIDUALS THROUGH UNQUALIFIED STAFF?: Requirements for personnel are lax, leading to possible endangerment of human life. Medical Screeners, responsible for interviewing citizens to be vaccinated, determining exposure risk, ascertaining risks of vaccination, doing risk-benefit analysis and assessing medical contraindications need not be a physician or nurse. An undefined "paraprofessional" is allowed-perhaps someone who may not be held to a high standard of medical ethics. Training is not described. Although screeners can ask a "physician consultant" to make a final determination regarding vaccination risks, screeners may not have enough knowledge to know when to ask for help, or may be more liable to succumb to assembly line pressures during a crisis. (Guidelines for Smallpox Vaccination Clinics, Annex 2, page A2-9)

In addition, Vaccination Administrators also need only be paraprofessionals, although doctors and nurses qualify. Training is limited to a CDC video, and although practice and mock drills are encouraged, they are not required. So actual practice and experience are not necessary. Vaccinators must also "be prepared to respond to medical emergencies that may occur within the vaccination area." It is not clear that such vaccinators must be qualified in CPR, emergency training, first aid, IV insertion, anaphylactic shock, or any other emergency situations. There is little to assure that public that qualified people will be on hand to evaluate risks, and handle emergencies. (Guidelines for Smallpox Vaccination Clinics, Annex 2, page A2-10 and A2-11) .

EXPERIMENTAL VACCINE WITHOUT CONSENT?: It appears that only those volunteering for the vaccination would be required to give their consent to vaccination "if the vaccine is still on Investigational New Drug status". Medical screeners are to ensure that the consent form is "read, understood and signed" by each recipient. (Guidelines for Smallpox Vaccination Clinics, Annex 2, page A2-9). For individuals who are sick, but may or may not have smallpox, it appears the vaccination would be mandatory, regardless of the risks. This is a violation of medical ethics and freedom of conscience. (Isolation and Quarantine Guidelines, Guide C, page C-5)

GOVERNMENT HEALTH SURVEILLANCE ENCOURAGED: Year-around reports to state health officials of all patients with illness that includes fever and vesicular/pustular rash are proposed. There is no acknowledgement or requirement of patient consent. Neither is there a requirement that such patients be notified that their information may be disclosed, or has been disclosed. (Surveillance, Contact Tracing, and Epidemiological Investigation, Guide A, pg A-1)

GOVERNMENT DATA COLLECTION VIOLATES PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY: Proposed is health and personal data collection after the first report of a case of smallpox. Data to be reported includes name, birth date, social security number, race, occupation, address, prior medical conditions, phone number, date of fever onset, vaccination status, date and place of medical examination, and final diagnosis, including not smallpox. Data is reported on each suspected/probable/confirmed smallpox case without patient consent or notification. In addition, some of the data - social security number, birth date, race, prior medical conditions, and occupation - seem unnecessary for simple tracking of illness. If plans include additional research on these individuals, a specific research consent should be obtained. In addition, there is no clear rationale for collection of data on those who are not confirmed cases, leaving citizens vulnerable to arbitrary decisions regarding data collection. (Surveillance, Contact Tracing, and Epidemiological Investigation, Guide A, pg A-9)

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